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COMMENTS
THE UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVIST': HAIR TODAY,
GONE TOMORROW
She asked me why, I'm just a hairy guy...
Don't ask me why, don't know
It's not for lack of bread...
Long beautiful hair...
Give me down to there, hair, shoulder length or longer
My hair like Jesus wore it, hallelujah I
Adore it, hallelujah Mary loved her son
Why don't my mother love me?
Hair, Gerome Ragni,
James Rado, Gait Macdermot (1968)
Alexander the Great ordered his troops to cut off their beards as a
military precaution. Peter the Great proscribed beards for his stubborn
subjects in an effort to Westernize them. - Raderman and Gianatasio were
commanded to cut their hair in order to "satisfactorily participate" in -their
respective Army Reserve and National Guard unit drills. Failure to obey
the manaates of Alexander and Peter, however, merely imposed a tax upon
the bearded while long-haired Raderman and Gianatasio faced orders to
active duty in the regular Army.
It has been suggested that "the first aim of military justice is not jus-
tice but discipline-discipline by any means.. . ... As methods of discipline,
the above hair restrictions have been sanctioned.
I. PRESENT PLIGHT OF THE RESERVIST: Raderman and Gianatasio
In 1969, Raderman v. Kaine4 was brought to establish substantive
rights for the Reservist. Harold Raderman had been "redlined"5 from
more than five reserve meetings for failure to measure up to Army stand-
1. In general, the National Guardsman [hereinafter referred to as Guardsman] is
subject to the same statutory and judicial restrictions as the United States Army Re-
servist [hereinafter referred to as Reservist]. There are, however, two notable distinctions
between the Guardsman and the Reservist that may bear upon points presented in this
comment: first, military jurisdiction over the Guardsman is conferred by state statute;
second, the protection of the Bill of Rights is applicable to the Guardsman through the
fourteenth amendment.
2. P. BINDER, MUFF AND MoAnr.s 87, 91 (1965).
3. R. SHERRILL, MILITARY JusricE is TO Jusric As MILTARY Music is TO Music
jacket (1969).
4. 411 F.2d 1102 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 396 U.S. 976 (1969).
5. A term used within the reserve units of the armed forces when a Reservist's
attendance at a meeting is not accepted.
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ards and was, therefore, facing imminent reactivation into the regular
Army. His hair was too long. The plaintiff joined the United States' Army
Reserve in 1963, served six months active duty and then returned to his
reserve unit to attend meetings for the balance of his obligation. Upon
return, he obtained employment in a theatrical agency as agent for "rock
and roll" bands. This position required him to wear his hair longer than
conventional Army length.6 The plaintiff was warned by his reserve unit
that if he did not get his hair cut he would be redlined. Raderman ex-
plained his employment position to the reserve unit and wrote letters to
his Congressman and to the Vice President, to no avail. A suit was then
brought challenging as unconstitutional, the application to him of certain
statutes, Army Regulations, and an Army Directive. It alleged, in particular,
denial of property or liberty to practice his chosen profession without due
process of law. The defendant, Major General Kaine, moved for an order
dismissing the complaint or alternatively for summary judgment in his
favor. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment and
the circuit court of appeals affirmed. Hetd, such an affirmative suit before
induction order, rather than by habeas corpus application after order, does
not establish the judiciary as arbiter of what constitutes a neat and sol-
dierly appearance for a reservist within the meaning of Army Regulation;
appearance is within the discretion of the military and the Army's de-
termination that haircuts be well-groomed, cut short or medium length,
and trimmed at all times, subject to no exceptions, was a rational exercise
of that discretion. The court therefore concluded that refusal to grant an
exception to an Army reservist whose job necessitated breach of those Army
regulations was not an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court of the
United States dismissed a petition for certiorari.
In 1970 Gianatasio v. Whyte7 was brought to establish procedural
rights for the Guardsman. Frank Gianatasio Jr. had been similarly red-
lined from more than five National Guard meetings for failure to measure
up to Army standards and was, therefore, facing imminent reactivation
into the regular Army. Gianatasio's hair also was too long. The plaintiff
had enlisted in the Connecticut Army National Guard in 1965, served his
required active duty period and then returned to his guard unit to attend
meetings for the balance of his obligation. While physically present and
ready to participate in these meetings he was informed by his commanding
officer that his non-conforming hairdo did not present the "neat appear-
ance" required by National Guard regulations. Gianatasio insisted that
his hair style was required for his civilian employment as a salesman of
6. Plaintiff's employer confirmed this in a letter stating that the plaintiff's value
to the firm "would be sharply curtailed" if his hair was short.
7. 426 F.2d 908 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 US. 941 (1970); accord, Scaggs v. Larsen,
423 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 930 (1970).
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fashionable apparel, and had a letter from his employer confirming this.
-He further contended that his hair was "neat" by all but Army standards.
An action was then brought for a declaratory judgment that the applica-
tion to Gianatasio of certain statutes, National Guard regulations, and
procedures pursuant to them was unconstitutional, as both imposing a
punishment and denying him the right to practice his chosen profession
without due process of law; in addition, an injunction reinstating him in
the National Guard and preventing his activation was sought. The de-
fendant, Lieutenant Whyte, moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion and the circuit court of appeals affirmed. Held,
the statute authorizing the direct ordering of a Guardsman to active duty
rather than in accordance with the procedures set forth in his enlistment
contract is constitutional. While this government imposition of direct
ordering to active duty may be punishment without the protection of
constitutionally required procedural rights, the plaintiff has not intimated
actual injury by lack of any of those procedures. On the issue of "neat
appearance" rules unjustly depriving the plaintiff of his right to a civilian
livelihood, Raderman remains controlling. The Supreme Court of the
United States denied certiorari.
Thus, it appears that the Reservist has no enforceable rights in the
area of personal appearance, note that both Raderman and Gianatasio
weie summary judgments for the defendant military officers. Contrasted
with this bleak prospective, however, is the conviction that the court did
not intend such an absolute denial of rights. For an astute analysis of the
Reservist's plight in this area, an understanding of the statutory and judi-
cial framework within which the Reserves operate is necessary.8
II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Congress' power to enact a code of laws for the Army is specifically
set forth in the Constitution.9 Under these laws, the President is authorized
to order td active duty any member of the Ready Reserve 0 who is not
8. This is not to imply that an understanding of the executive, as Commander in
Chief of the Army, would not be beneficial. Such an endeavor, however, is beyond the
scope of this comment. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,366, 32 C.F.R. 11411 (1967).
9. See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, c. 14, empowering Congress "[t]o make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."
10. The Ready Reserve contract requires one active duty period of not less than
120 days for basic and MOS training, supplemented by 48 local reserve unit drills and
a 2 week active duty training period per year for the remainder of the six year obligation.
The 48 drills are usually held either 1 night a week or 1 weekend a month, depending
on the unit. The reservist is allowed unexcused absences at not more than 10% of his
meetings, without disciplinary action. Format A, 6-year enlistment in a unit of the United
States Army Reserve (17-25 incl.).
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"participating satisfactorily."" "To achieve fair treatment among members
of the Ready Reserve," however, consideration is given to "family responsi-
bilities; and employment necessary to maintain national health, safety or
interest."' 2 Members of reserve units are also exempt from induction into
the regular Army only "so long as they continue to be such members and
satisfactorily participate in scheduled drills and training periods as pre-
scribed by the Secretary of Defense . . .".13 Army Regulations prescribed
by the Secretary of Defense vis-h-vis the Department of the Army define
"satisfactory participation" as "attendance at all scheduled unit training
assemblies ... unless excused by proper authority;" a member is not satis-
factorily participating "unless he is in the prescribed uniform, presents a
neat and soldierly appearance, and performs his assigned duties in a satis-
factory manner as determined by the unit commander."' 4 Army Regula-
tions enacted in 1967 define "military discipline," as "a state of individual
and group training that creates a mental attitude resulting in correct con-
duct and automatic obedience to military law under all conditions. It is
found upon respect for and loyalty to properly constituted authority."'1
Changes made in 1969 to the above regulation on "military discipline"
set specific standards defining a "neat and soldierly appearance" for hair
and went on to include sideburns in a section on "appearance," as follows:
(1) It is the responsibility of commanders to see that military
personnel present a neat and soldierly appearance. Command-
ers will establish policies and standards in the area of per-
sonal appearance to insure that the members of their com-
mand appear neat and soldierly. Degrading or depersonalizing
actions, such as -the practice of requiring heads of soldiers to
be shaved, are forbidden. However, a soldier may voluntarily
have his head shaved.
(2) The hair, including sideburns, will be well-groomed, cut short
or medium length and neatly trimmed at all times. The face
will be clean shaven, with the exception that wearing a neatly
trimmed mustache is permitted.' 6
Below the level of Army Regulations, are the Army Directives promul-
gated by the unit commanders. For example, until July 1, 1968 an Army
Directive gave individuals "the right to retain long hair" if it contributed
"to the individual's civilian livelihood."' 7 At that time it was superseded
11. 10 U.S.C. § 673 (a) (Supp. IV, 1969), Military Selective Service Act of 1967.
12. Id.
13. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456 (c) (Supp. IV, 1969), Military Selective Service Act of
1967.
14. Army Reg. 135-91 (5) (d) (2) (June 11, 1968).
15. Army Reg. 600-20 (Jan. 31, 1967).
16. Army Reg. 600-20 with C5 and C6 (Dec. 18, 1969).
17. Weekly Bulletin 42, October 20, 1967. See also Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2d 141 (2d
Cir. 1969).
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by another directive which prohibited reservists, without exception, from
wearing their hair longer than the standard set forth in the above regula-
tion. Below the level of Army Directives are the discretionary policies of
the local commanding officer "in the area of personal appearance." These
policies may impose additional standards upon the Reservist or, by selec-
tive enforcement, ease existing standards. While the mandate for personal
appearance standards begins at -the upper end of the chain of command,
the codification of standards often begins, for expediency, on the lower
level of the unit commanders.
This complex interrelationship of the military's statutes, regulations,
directives and local policies places the Reservist within an institutional
maze. At the very least, therefore, judicial review seems necessary to protect
the Reservist from an abuse of "military discipline."
HI. JuDicIL DEVELOPMENT
Traditionally, military matters, including purely discretionary decisions
of military officers, have been held judicially non-reviewable.1 8 In Harmon
v. Brucker'9 the Supreme Court limited its non-review of military actions
to cases where the military personnel acted within their statutory author-
ity.20 However, the Reservist does not obtain a vested right in a statute
or regulation when he joins -the armed forces and such statutes and regu-
lations can be changed subsequently without permitting judicial review.2 '
Notwithstanding this abstention policy toward military affairs, in 1961 the
judiciary ruled that a military litigant need not exhaust his administrative
remedies to obtain judicial review. 22 In 1965, the judiciary held that it
would review military regulations to see that procedural due process was
accorded the plaintiff.2 3 Finally, in Winters v. United States,24 Mr. Justice
Douglas, as Circuit Justice, held that it would stay a ready reservist's re-
activation pending a determination on the merits in the court of appeals.
The Court reasoned that one of its most important functions historically,
has been to protect people who had been placed beyond its reach by mili-
tary discipline or punishment. Therefore, the Court has apparently estab-
18. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953); McCurdy v. Zuckert, 359 F.2d 491
(5th Cir. 1966).
19. 355 U.S. 579 (1958) (per curiam).
20. See, e.g., Byrne v. Resor, 412 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1969); Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2d
141 (2d Cir. 1969).
21. Heuchman v. Laird, 427 F.2d 980 (8th Cir. 1970); Schwartz v. Franklin, 412
F.2d 736 (9th Cir. 1969); Fox v. Brown, 402 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1968).
22. Ogden v. Zuckert, 298 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
23. Dunbar v. Ailes, 230 F. Supp. 87 (D.D.C. 1964), aft'd, 348 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
24. 89 S.Ct. 57 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1968).
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lished jurisdiction to review military matters both procedurally and
substantively.
Since the Court's departure from its policy of abstaining in military
affairs has been recent, there is little common law concerning military
regulations. There are, however, analogous physical appearance regulations
in the area of school law. Cases challenging these school regulations are
presently being decided. Also analogous has been the apparent abstention
policy the courts have developed towards review of school regulations. In
Board of Education v. Barnette,s the Supreme Court recognized that
boards of education have "important, delicate and highly discretionary
functions, but none that they may not perform within the limits of the
Bill of Rights."26 The Court reasoned, however, that "[w]e cannot because
of modest estimates of our competence in such specialties as public edu-
cation, withhold the judgment that history authenticates as the functions
of this Court when liberty is infringed." 27 The Court concluded that the
flag salute was a form of communication and enjoined enforcement of the
Board of Education regulation requiring a flag salute, where it infringed
upon a person's first amendment right to religious freedom.
Since 1966, numerous actions have been brought challenging board
of education regulations forbidding male students to wear long hair. Seven
recent circuit courts of appeals decisions have imparted a division among
four of the circuits. 28 In Ferrell v. Independent School District,29 the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held the hair regulation valid, reasoning that
the Constitution does not establish an absolute right to free expression of
ideas, but one which may be infringed by the state if there are compelling
reasons to do so; a regulation considered by the principal to be necessary
in order to provide the best possible education was such a compelling
reason.30 In Breen v. Kahl,31 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held
25. 319 US. 624 (1943).
26. Id. at 637.
27. Id. at 640.
28. Since this comment's primary concern is Reserve Regulations, only the circuit
courts of appeals' decisions in the area of school law will be presented for analogy;
these decisions encompass the varying opinions of all the school cases.
29. 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 85 (1968). Plaintiffs were male
students refused enrollment in high school for failure to comply with a school regula-
tion banning long hair. The students wore their hair long because they were members
of a "rock and roll" musical group. Accord, Stevenson v. Board of Education, 426 F.2d
1154 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970); Griffin v. Tatum, 425 F.2d 201
(5th Cir. 1970); Davis v. Firment 408 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1969). Cf. Brooks v. Wain-
wright, 428 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1970) upholding prisoner haircut and shaving regula.
tions.
80. The court also concluded that school, at this stage of the plaintiff's life, might
be his most important activity. Ferrel v. School District, 392 F-2d 697, 704 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 85 (1968).
81. 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970). Plaintiffs were
male students expelled from high school for challenging the following regulation by
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the hair regulation invalid reasoning that freedom to wear one's hair at a
certain length or in any desired manner is protected, by the Constitution
as a form of expression, even though it expresses nothing but individual
taste; the state failed to meet its burden of justifying the regulation which
invaded that freedom. Judge Kerner further reasoned that the manner in
which many young people wear their hair is an expression of individuality,
of the freedom of a person to present himself physically to the world in
the manner of his choice, and possibly, even expression of a cultural re-
volt.82 Judge Kerner concluded that it was a highly-protected freedom and
that the state may not suppress such conduct simply because it may express
a disapproved attitude.83 In Jackson v. Dorrier,3 4 the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals held the hair regulation valid, reasoning that the objecting
students' hair lengths were not intended as expression within the concept
of free speech and, that there was substantial evidence to show a reasonable
connection between the regulation and the successful operation of an edu-
cational system by maintaining school discipline; therefore, the regulation
did not violate the constitutional rights of the students. And in Richards
v. Thurston, 5 the First Circuit Court of Appeals held the hair regulation
invalid reasoning that the due process clause establishes a sphere of per-
sonal liberty which includes the right to wear one's hair as he wishes sub-
ject -to state infringement only for legitimate public purposes; no justifi-
cation had been offered for the regulation. The court further reasoned
that there was "no inherent reason why decency, decorum or good conduct
requifefd] a boy to wear his hair short" and concluded that "compelled
conformity to conventional standards of appearance [was not] a justifiable
part of the educational process." 3 6 In addition, in Tinker v. Independent
School District,3T the Supreme Court held that the wearing of armbands
in school for the purpose of expressing one's views was a form of com-
munication protected by the free speech clause of the first amendment.
Mr. Justice Fortas reasoned that "in our system, undifferentiated fear or
wearing long hair: "Hair should be washed, combed and worn so it does not hang below
the collar line in the back, over the ears on the side, and must be above the eyebrows.
Boys must be clean shaven; long sideburns are out."
32. 419 F.2d at 1036.
33. Id. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) holding that the right
of a husband and wife to use contraceptives, a right of marirtal privacy, is highly
protected.
34. 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970). Plaintiffs were male students who refused to
comply with a public school regulation that required them to cut their long hair as a
prerequisite to attending high school. The students permitted their hair to grow
because they were members of a musical combo.
35. 424 F.2d 1281 (Ist Cir. 1970). Plaintiffs were male students who were sus-
pended from high school for wearing their hair longer than school regulations allowed.
36. Id. at 1286.
37. 393 US. 503 (1969). It should be noted that the Court distinguishes this case
from cases involving dress or clothing regulation in schools.
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apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to free-
dom of expression . . . our Constitution says we must take the risk."88
Thus, the free speech clause of the first amendment and the due process
clause of the fifth and fourteenth -amendments have been construed as
creating physical appearance rights for individuals under the discretion of
governmental agencies; note that no school case was decided by summary
judgment for the defendant school board. In view of the statutory and
judicial background, one must question the propriety of denying the Re-
servist the right to wear his hair in any desired manner.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE RESERvES' HAIR RESTRICTIONS
A. Judicial Review for the Reservist
After being "redlined" from five meetings, the Reservist has not only
been precluded from fulfilling his contractual obligation but also faces the
punishment of imminent call-up for active duty, an establishment of actual
and potential injury. Often the Reservist's functioning in his civilian em-
ployment has also been seriously impaired.8 9 He has suffered these injuries
as a result of trying to express himself through the manner in which he
wears his hair. The nature and location of the injury, the status of the
plaintiff at the time of injury, and the nature of the right abridged de-
termine whether 'the military or civil judiciary shall have jurisdiction.40
The Reservist, when he is not on active duty,4' is only a part-time soldier;
for more than 28 days a month he is a civilian. As a civilian he is subject
to civilian laws and entitled to protection in civilian courts. The Reservist's
injuries all relate to this civilian status he maintains. If the Reservist cuts
his hair, his civilian job may suffer; if he does not cut his hair, he is subject
to complete removal from civilian status. In addition, the reserve contract,
which the Reservist is forced to breach by being redlined, has a civilian
nature. It was signed when the Reservist was a full-time civilian and sets the
time limits during which his civilian status may be superseded by the mili-
tary. If the militai-y seeks to extend this time limit by unilateral action,
surely a question of civilian rights has been raised. These dual status prob-
lems are generated because a part-time standard concerning hair cannot be
applied to a part-time soldier. The result is a full time hair standard. Unlike
his uniform which can be taken off when he returns from his drill, if the
Reservist cuts his hair according to military standards, it necessarily re-
38. Id. at 508.
39. See, e.g., supra note 6.
40. See generally United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); Ex
parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
41. For what constitutes active duty see supra note 10.
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mains that way when he returns from his drill, thereby affecting his civilian
rights. Therefore, even if the Reservist's employment would not suffer
when he cut his hair for Reserve drills, his civilian right to freedom of ex-
pression and liberty via the manner in which he chose to wear his hair,
would be seriously infringed. To view the situation in Raderman and
Gianatasio as strictly a military matter is to deny the reality of the Re-
servist's status. As a result, the civil judiciary must be the arbiter of whether
there is sufficient justification for infringement of the Reservist's rights.4
However, even if Raderman and Gianatasio are improperly viewed as a
military matter, the Supreme Court has departed from its abstention policy
toward military affairs. And, as in Winters, the civil judiciary must make
a determination on the merits of the rights of the Reservist.
B. Historical and Institutional Analysis of Man and His Hair
"Nothing man wears is an accident. He dresses in sympathy with his
age." 43 As far back as primitive man, hair has been styled and worn as a
sign of feats and qualities or as a symbol of mourning or joy.4 The an-
cients regarded the beard as a sacred token of virility, and looked upon
hair as the source of strength 45 Short hair was often a sign of servitude,
as among the Greeks, Celts, and Germans. 46 In the 1 th century the Church
forbade men to wear long hair.47 By the 12th century bishops carried
scissors to effectuate the Church's protest against the vanity of men grow-
ing long hair.48 Something in the psychology of war, however, favored
the growth of hair on men; the Crusades fostered the Saracenic mustache,
the Napoleonic wars encouraged sideburns, the Crimean war brought forth
the shaggy beard and Prussian militants turned up the ends of their mus-
taches "fiercely like two bayonet-points." 49 Therefore, until World War I,
except for a brief interlude during the French Revolution, men wore
lengthy hair in opposition to those prior restrictions and symbolizations.50
World War I gave rise, for reasons of sanitation, to short hair for military
men and that style became the vogue until the mid-1960's, when men re-
turned to a lengthy hair style.
42. Cf. Gerwig, Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Weekend Reservists', 44 MI.. L.
Rv. 123 (1969) contending that the Uniform Code of Military Justice does not extend
to Reservists on weekend drills.
43. P. BINDER, MUFF AND MORALS 96 (1965).
44. THE COLUMBIA ENcYcLOPEDIA 842 (2d ed. 1959).
45. "Beards were held in such esteem in Babylon that no oath was considered legal
and binding unless sworn on one." P. BNDER, MUFF AND MORALS 85, 100 (1965).
46. THE COLUMBIA ENCYcLOPEDIA 842 (2d ed. 1959).
47. Id.
48. P. BINDER, MUFF AND MORALS 102 (1965).
49. Id. at 95-96.
50. See THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 842 (2d ed. 1959).
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Concurrent with the return to a lengthy hair style, however, has been
the growth of institutional opposition to such expression.51 Even a cursory
examination of any of the media of today clearly shows that those opposed
to long hair on men do consider it a form of expression.52 A study of the
thousands of students who, each year, are threatened with suspension from
school for wearing long haircuts makes it equally clear that those in favor
of long hair on men consider it a form of expression.5 3 A study of those
Reservists "redlined" each year for wearing their hair too long would re-
inforce this conclusion. The term "expression" is deprived of much of its
meaning when personal appearance is excluded from its scope because per-
sonal taste in grooming is self-expression.54 Therefore, the issue becomes
whether the Bill of Rights protects the self-expression, through hair style,
of a Reservist.
C. Applicability of the Bill of Rights
"[O]ur citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply
because they have doffed their civilian clothes."65 Accordingly, our Re-
servists, with their dual status, must be protected. A problem arises, how-
ever, upon trying to squarely fit a right of personal appearance into the
sphere of rights protected by the first ten amendments; something does not
fit squarely into a sphere.
But the ideas of 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness' ex-
pressed in the Declaration of Independence, later found specific
definition in the Constitution itself, including of course freedom
of expression and a wide zone of privacy. I had supposed those
guarantees permitted idiosyncracies to flourish, especially when
they concern the image of one's personality and his philosophy
toward government and his fellow men.56
While the school law cases exemplify the problem, they do suggest two
sound bases for protecting the Reservists' right to expression through hair-
style.
In Richards, 'the right to wear one's hair as one desires was considered
protected by the due process clause, as within the concept of liberty.
51. See generally E. GoFEmAN, ASYLUMS (1961), concerning institutional discipline.
52. See, e.g., LiFE, Mar. 20, 1970, at 34. A roadsign on many of our highways sug-
gests "Help Clean Up America, Get a Haircut." This same feeling is echoed in the
"Letters to the Editor" columns of our local newspapers and on many of the radio
and television talk shows. To arouse such a response, the wearing of long hair by men
must be a form of communication.
53. Comment, A Student's Right to Govern His Personal Appearance, 17 J. Pun. L.
151, 171 (1968), citing 3 EDUCATION AGE 23 (1966).
54. Comment, supra note 53, at 161.
55. Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 181, 188, (1962).
56. Ferrell v. Independent School District, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
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"'[L]iberty' seems to us as incomplete protection if it encompasses only
the right to do momentous acts, leaving the state free to interfere with
those personal aspects of our lives which have no direct bearing on the
ability of others to enjoy their liberty."57 This concept recognizes the
existence of substantive rights, beyond those specifically enumerated in
other amendments, as being implicit in the "liberty" assurance of the due
process clause, and considers a right to one's personality as one of them.
Richards is probably the best reasoned of all the school-law opinions, de-
veloping a broad, strong principle to protect the individual without alter-
ing traditional notions about freedoms under the Bill of Rights.5 8 Pleading
violation of -the due process clause, however, may not ,be the strongest
argument for the Reservist. The reluctance of the courts to review military
discipline has been unparalleled, and overcoming this reluctance will re-
quire military interference with the most preferred freedoms.59 Alleging
violation of a substantive due process right is too often treated as merely
an issue of procedural due process for which adequate notice to the Re-
servist will satisfy constitutional requirements. 0 In addition, all substan-
tive due process violations are often viewed together, with a remedy or
justification for the regulation violating the more dearly enunciated rights
satisfying -all due process requirements. For example, the Reservist usually
will allege deprivation of property without due process of law because the
hair restriction has impeded his civilian employment. 61 The court may
be able to resolve this issue on a non-constitutional basis by suggesting
that the Reservist can wear a wig for his civilian job,6 2 and view any other
substantive due process allegations as derived from this property right.
Finally, overcoming the reluctance of the courts will also require the show-
ing of military interference with a right that will allow the court to de-
57. Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284 (1st Cir. 1970).
58. While Richards acknowledges that hair style or length may contain elements
of expression or speech, the court specifically rejects the notion that communication
through hair length is entitled to first amendment protection. Id. at 1283.
59. Only the military hair regulation cases were summary judgments for the
defendant.
60. This unfortunate reality is created by the interaction of substantive and
procedural due process. A violation of substantive due process always gives rise to a
violation of procedural due process to the extent, at least, that there has not been
an adequate hearing on the regulation. Remedying the procedural defect is then
viewed as satisfying the substantive violation. Relating the effect of the procedural
violation to the plaintiff Reservist, however, its remedy is translated as merely requiring
adequate notice of the regulation and of the Reservist's violation of it.
61. The Reservist will usually plead deprivation of property without due process,
even though it may weaken his other constitutional arguments, because it has tradi-
tionally been his strongest case for relief from the hair restrictions on an administrative
level. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. Therefore, the Reservist will have
made his civilian employment argument a part of his military record and feel com-
pelled to include it in his pleadings.
62. See Gianatasio v. Whyte, 426 F.2d 908, 911 (2d Cir. 1970).
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velop a narrow principle for protecting the individual. 63 Establishing
personal appearance rights as implicit within the concept of liberty under
the due process clause is "painting with a broad brush"; numerous mili-
tary regulations might then be challenged as interfering with implicit liber-
ties.
In Breen, wearing one's hair as one desired was considered a form
of expression protected by the Constitution, possibly under the free speech
clause of the first amendment.0 4 This concept should be extended to recog-
nize expression through hair style as clearly protected by the free speech
clause of the first amendment as freedom of communication. Formulated
in this manner, the Reservist could present his strongest argument, that
military hair restrictions create a prima facie violation of his first amend-
ment right to freedom of communication.65 The first amendment protects
the most preferred freedoms and the judicial recognition of the right to
wear one's hair as one pleases, within the free speech clause, need not
create a broad, sweeping principle. The courts, however, have traditionally
protected only political communication under the free speech clause.00
Coupling this policy with the judicial reluctance to review military dis-
cipline, a strong mandate against providing judicial protection of the Re-
servist is established. It is clear that the Reservist who merely expresses
his personality or aesthetic values will not cause the courts to depart from
this mandate. Therefore, the Reservist might plead and prove the actual
and potential political aspects of the communication via the length of his
hair; for example, that his hairstyle indicates association with a particular
political group or philosophy, or that it indicates rejection of particular
63. See generally Raderman v. Kaine, 411 F.2d 1102, 1106 (2d Cir. 1969), evincing
a strong reluctance by the court to become the arbiter of military regulations.
64. Breen cited Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and considered
expression by hair style to be protected by a penumbra of rights under the first and
ninth amendments if it was not protected by the free speech clause of the first amend-
ment alone. Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1036) (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
937 (1970). This constitutional approach, alleging that a right of personal appearance
is protected by several amendments without specifying exactly which amendment
creates the right, also appears to be a weak argument for the Reservist. The reluctance
of the court to review military matters would probably prevail.
65. Recognizing the free speech clause to encompass "communication" and com-
munication to encompass expression through hair length, appears a stronger formulation
than considering expression through hair length a form of symbolic speech. The latter
formulation requires considering hair merely a "symbol" of speech, a less compelling
reason for the courts to overcome their reluctance to review military discipline.
66. It was probably for this reason that Breen took the route it did. But see
generally Hyman & Newhouse, Standards for Preferred Freedoms: Beyond the First, 60
Nw. U.L. Rxv. 1 (1965). It should also be noted, however, that political expression
within the military is not accorded the same protection as in civilian life. See, e.g.,
Kester, Soldiers Who Insult The President: An Uneasy Look at Article 88 Of The
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 81 HAv. L. Rxv. 1697 (1968).
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political ideas or philosophies, or that it expresses a revolt against con-
ventionality laden with specific political implications.6 7 In addition, it
might be advisable for the Reservist to restrict his pleadings to interference
with substantive rights under the first amendment, eliminating a court
conclusion ,that he was groping among the amendments hoping to find a
violated right.68
Accordingly, it might also be advisable for the Reservist not to plead
deprivation of constitutionally-required procedural rights under the fourth,
fifth, sixth, and eighth amendments, unless he had not received any notice
of the hair restrictions or his violations of them.69
Having established a prima fade interference with the Reservists', first
amendment rights, any motion by the defendant for summary judgment
should be denied. The issue is now whether the military via the defendant
officer can present a sufficient public interest to warrant the hair restrictions.
D. Absence of Military Justification
In weighing the countervailing interest, one must take into account
the nature of the right asserted, the context in which it is asserted, and
the extent to which it has been infringed. When Alexander the Great
ordered his troops to remove their beards, it was a military precaution
"to remove the handle which the enemy can seize. . . ."70 Similarly, when
a Reservist's wearing of his hair at a certain length is viewed as a form of
communication, only a "sufficiently important governmental interest in
regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedom."71 The governmental interest must be either self-
evident or affirmatively proven. In addition, the hair restriction must be
inherently or affirmatively shown to relate to the governmental interest.
In both Raderman and Gianatasio, the court failed to require suffi-
cient justification for the Army's application of its hair standards to Re-
servists. The court in Raderman reasoned 'that "the armed services, their
officers and their manner of discipline serve an essential function in safe-
67. In Gianatasio, the defendant commanding officer apparently considered the
Reservist's long hair as political expression. "This fortuitous connection with one of the
world's great national holidays commemorating the overthrow of despotic power by
non-conformists was of no moment . . . until, symbolically, appellants' commanding
officers . . . concluded . . . that appellants long hair caused him to be guilty of 'unsatis-
factory performance."' Gianatasio v. Whyte, 426 F.2d 908, 909 (2d Cir. 1970).
68. The thought here is that the Reservist will not prevail under the other
amendments. See Raderman v. Kaine, 411 F.2d 1102 (2d Cir. 1969).
69. See discussion in supra note 60. Cf. Gianatasio v. Whyte, 426 F.2d 908, 911
(2d Cir. 1970): "Gianatasio has failed to show . . . [that he has] substantive rights to
protect, we fail to see how any hypothetical deprivations of procedural rights can
harm him."
70. P. BINDER, MUFF AND MORALS 87 (1965).
71. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
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guarding the country."72 Therefore, "[t]he need for discipline, with the
attendant impairment of certain rights, is an important factor in fully
discharging that duty." 73 The court further reasoned that Raderman chose
to join a Reserve unit; "[c]oncomitant with that decision was the knowl-
edge that he would be subject -to Army rules and regulations concerning his
appearance for six years." 74 And what constitutes a neat and soldierly ap-
pearance, for the Reservist, within such regulations, certainly is within the
discretion of the military36 In addition, the court found that the frequent
need for expedition in call-up orders limited judicial review of military
discretion.6 The court also considered the radical change in appearance
of the military throughout history, but determined that "past practices
afford no criteria for the present."77 The court concluded that there was
"dearly no action by the military which [went] far beyond any rationaIl
exercise of discretion."'71 The court in Gianatasio, without requiring any
military justification, simply declined to overrule Raderman on the sub-
stantive issues. In fact, the court concluded that the National Guard never
even considered whether the Guardsman's hair affected his performance,
"but only that his hair length did not conform to aesthetic requirements."70
While the armed forces do serve an essential function in safeguarding
the country, no proof is offered to show that their manner of discipline
serves -this function. Instead, a sort of disciplinary domino theory is offered
by the court in Raderman; since effectiveness of the Army depends on dis-
cipline, and discipline depends on hair restrictions, therefore hair restric-
tions make the Army effective in providing for national defense.8 0 It is
difficult to comprehend, however, how hair restrictions, as a means of Army
discipline, relate at all to safeguarding the country.8 1 "[The] concept of
'national defense' cannot be deemed an end in itself, justifying any exer-
cise of legislative power designed to promote such a goal. Implicit in the
term 'national defense' is the notion of defending those values and ideals
which set this Nation apart .... It would indeed be ironic if, in the name
of national defense, we would sanction the subversion of one of those lib-
72. Raderman v. Kaine, 411 F.2d 1102, 1104 (2d Cir. 1969).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1106.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1105.
77. Id. at 1106.
78. Id.
79. Gianatasio v. Whyte, 426 F.2d 908, 909 (2d Cir. 1970).
80. See Kester, Soldiers Who Insult The President: An Uneasy Look At Article
88 Of The Uniform Code of Military Justice, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1697, 1753 (1968).
81. Hair restrictions do not even seem to relate to the function of "military
discipline," which requires the breeding of "respect for and loyalty to properly con-
stituted authority." Army Reg. 600-20 (Jan. 31, 1967).
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erties. . . which make the defense of the Nation worthwhile."' 2 Therefore,
in order 'to properly justify its restrictions the Army sh6uld at least have
to prove that soldiers nonconforming in appearance only, perform less
effectively than conforming soldiers. While the court in Gianatasio spe-
cifically concluded that no determination of this type was even considered,
the only relevant information for the court in Raderman, was the past
practices of the military. The court should have noted that great officers
and great armies 'throughout history have fought valiantly and brilliantly
protecting their countries and our country, while sporting prodigious coif-
fures, beards and mustaches.s3 Even today, mustaches are allowed within
the Army and beards are allowed by the Naval Reserves.8 4 The fact that
the plaintiff chose to join the reserves does not alleviate the defendant's
burden of proving a public purpose in the Army's hair restrictions. This
is especially cear in view of -the frequency of change in Army directives
and regulations which determine -the current Army hair standards.8 5
In addition, the court in Raderman failed to distinguish at all between
the function of the regular Army and the function of the Army Reserves
and their respective necessary disciplinary practices;8 6 to consider their
function the same is a denial of reality. While the court recognized that
a reservist is "neither a civilian nor a full-time soldier," it treated the case
82. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967), the Court weighing the
justification for a statute restricting first amendment rights.
83. See supra text, section IV B.
84. Army Reg. 600-20 with C5 and C6 (Dec. 18, 1969); U.S. Navy Uniform
Regulations, art. 1161 § a (1970).
85. While the Reservist has been held not to have a vested right in the statutes
and regulations in force at the time he joined the military, (cases cited supra note 21),
he has apparently been vested with any duties that may be created as the statutes and
regulations change. This unique privilege that is given to the armed forces, to uni-
laterally alter both their rights and duties under a contract, places the Reservist in
a rather precarious position. For example, Raderman cannot rely on the pre-July 1968
Directive aUowing long hair if it is necessary for civilian employment, while the Army
can rely on the July 1968 Directive not allowing long hair for any reason. See supra
note 17 and accompanying text.
In addition, allowing extension of this privilege to deny to the Reservist either
constitutional rights or rights specifically enunciated in the clauses of his Reserve
contract should require careful scrutiny by the courts. At this point a valid, enforce-
able Reserve contract no longer exists; all mutuality of obligation has been removed.
The court might even protect the Reservist from this situation. with a simple remedy.
A grandfather clause could be read into all of the statute and regulation changes,
deeming that the intent of the rule-making body was to uphold the already existing
contract. The procedural issues in Gianatasio involved such an extension. While further
development of this situation is recommended, it is beyond the scope of this comment.
86. For example, in Reserve units new recruits often wear their civilian clothes
until they go on active duty and are issued uniforms. This results in a non-conform-
ing appearance among the men in the reserve unit regardless of hair style. There are
always new recruits in a reserve unit.
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as strictly a military matter.87 However, it was the plaintiff's civilian status
that was being injured.
Finally, in Raderman there was no need for an expeditious call-up
requiring military discretion rather than judicial review. There was no
national emergency, and a Reservist's fundamental rights were in issue.
Certainly, the courts in Raderman and Gianatasio should not have granted
the defendants' motions for summary judgment.
Assuming that through the structure of this comment the Reservist
has established an interference with his first amendment freedom of com-
munication, the Army has clearly failed to meet its burden of proving a
"sufficiently important governmental interest"88 to justify this interference.
In order to effectuate this analysis, however, an appropriate legal remedy
must be formulated to establish enforceable legal rights for the Reservist
while maintaining the same basic judicial and legislative framework upon
which the Reserves now function.
E. Providing a Legal Remedy
When restrictions upon a first amendment freedom have been estab-
lished and no governmental interest is shown, the regulations invading
that freedom are unconstitutional as violations of the first amendment.
If a public purpose is shown but the regulations do not relate to it, the
regulations must similarly be held unconstitutional in their application.
The application of Army hair standards to the Reservist falls into either
of the above categories; if there is a public purpose, it certainly has no
relation to the regulations in their present form.
The judiciary might, therefore, take cognizance of its responsibility
to civilians and provide affirmative relief for the Reservist whose freedom
has been arbitrarily interfered with. The remedy may be simple and lim-
ited. First, the court might enjoin the lowest echelon officers from both
prohibiting (or ordering the prohibiting of) Reservists from attending
meetings, and from crediting (or ordering the crediting of) Reservists with
unsatisfactory participation at a meeting, when the reason for these actions
is based solely upon the Reservist's nonconformance with the Army's phys-
ical appearance standards (not including uniform requirements) .89 This
87. Raderman v. Kaine, 411 F.2d 1102, 1106 (2d Cir. 1969).
88. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
89. The 'injunction is aimed at the bottom of the chain-of-command for several
reasons: first, it does not restrict military authority on any major level, or hamper
military efficiency on any major level; second, it does not vest in the judiciary any mili-
tary control on a major level; third, it affects the military level with the most con-
trol over the Reservist; fourth, it creates an effective stopgap should the upper levels
of the chain-of-command decide to alter their regulatory scheme to avoid the injunction
(that is, rule-making decisions take place at the top echelon of the military but their
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relief is not discriminatory against soldiers in the regular Army because
once activated, the Reservist is neither attending meetings nor under the
protection of the injunction. That is, the Reservist can always receive a
haircut when activated (other than ANAGDUTRA),90 thereby receiving
equal treatment with the members of .the regular Army when in equivalent
status with them. In addition, the relief does not extend beyond those
restrictions which necessarily interfere with the Reservist's freedom as a
civilian.91 It does, however, establish enforceable rights for the Reservist
as a civilian without altering the military institution in any functional way.
Second, -the court might set down a flexible standard for determining
when military discipline will outweigh interference with a fundamental
right. This standard would determine the future propriety of issuing an
injunction similar to the one proposed above. The guideline should not
be so strict that the Army is placed in the nearly impossible position of
showing in every case that the Reservist's act posed an actual threat to
military discipline, or so liberal that the Reservist is deprived of his funda-
mental rights without any proof of the relationship between his behavior
and a legitimate governmental interest.92 For example, a hair regulation
applicable to the Reservist should be upheld and an injunction against
military officers should not issue, if there is substantial evidence that actual
or potential interference with something more -than a purely ministerial
military function will be the proximate result of a violation of personal
appearance regulations. The evidence should be geographically and chro-
nologically relevant.93 The greater -the interference or the more preferred
the freedom, the stricter the standard should be.
Finally, it is suggested 'that the court need not declare void any statute,
Army regulation or directive, and thereby destroy the complex statutory
scheme within which the Reserves and regular Army function. The court
need only provide some narrow remedy to protect those individuals whose
rights have been infringed without justification.
enforcement upon the troops takes place at the bottom echelon) and; fifth, it is
doubtful that higher ranking officers would now try to enforce the restrictions.
90. For the purposes of this proposal, the Reservists' two week annual active duty
training commitment (ANACDUTRA) is not meant to alter his reserve status or
remove him from protection of the injunction. See Format A, supra note 10.
91. This is accomplished by having the court order focus on the Reservist's
fundamental rights as a civilian and enjoining the regulations which conflict with those
rights, rather than focusing on the specific restrictions which are unconstitutional.
92. Cf. Kester, Soldiers Who Insult The President: An Uneasy Look at Article 88
Of The Uniform Code of Military Justice, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1697, 1751 (1968).
93. Potential or actual interference may depend on the hair style preferences and
prejudices of the other members of the military unit or military base and the members
of the surrounding civilian community. Hair styles tend to differ throughout the
country. In addition, the possibility of interference dissipates with time as the non-
conforming hair style becomes in vogue.
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V. AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION: CONFORMING WIGS
One alternative remedy to the Reservists' plight, which initially ap-
pears to avoid all constitutional problems, is to allow the Reservist to wear
a wig. Shall he wear a short-hair wig to his Reserve meetings, keeping his
real hair long, or wear a long-hair wig as a civilian, keeping his real hair
short for reserve meetings? For expedience, convenience, and comfort, the
Reservist should choose the short-hair wig; the overwhelming majority of
the time he is a dvilian.9 4
A short-hair wig, conforming to Army Regulation standards of "short
of medium length" and "neatly trimmed" should "appear soldierly," there-
by satisfying all the requirements for Reserve meetings.915 Around the
beginning of 1970, Reservists were thus enlightened and by the end of the
year the short-hair wig was very much in vogue at week-end meetings.90
During this time, however, the Army's institutional complex had spent
several monthsanalyzing the situation, and reached their usual decision.97
On June 24, 1970 an Army Directive was issued from the office of Major
General Kaine, the defendant officer in Raderman, stating that Reservists
were prohibited from wearing wigs during meetings unless necessitated by
medical reasons as verified by a medical doctor.98 Latest research reveals
that Reservists are now seeking "radiclib" dermatologists for verification
that medical reasons necessitate their wearing a wig at meetings.
The wearing of a short-hair wig to meetings was a simple, convenient
remedy for the Reservist. It is unfortunate that the Army found it neces-
sary to proscribe, rather than mandate its use. The suggestion may now
be made, however, that another alternative remedy is to let the Reservist
wear a long-hair wig for civilian life. Such a suggestion merely avoids the
issues without offering a remedy. Unless the Army can justify its directive
against wigs, the constitutional issues that have been developed throughout
this comment are again raised with the remedy of injunction again sug-
gested. The difference between the wearing of a short-hair wig for meet-
ings and the wearing of a long-hair wig for civilian life, is that the latter
is an infringement on the rights of a civilian.
94. See supra text, section IV A.
95. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
96. See LIFE, Mar. 20, 1970, at 34.
97. Viewing the changes in Army Reg. 600-20 (Jan. 31, 1967) to its present form
as Army Reg. 600-20 with C5 and C6 (Dec. 18, 1969), it becomes apparent that the
regulation will change to prohibit a manner of personal appearance that has been
traditionally nonconforming as soon as it becomes popular.
98. 1st Army Cir. 600-12 (June 24, 1970), pending revision of Army Reg. 600-20
with C5 and C6 (Dec. 18, 1969).
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VI. CONCLUSION
While Congress has almost unrestricted discretion in legislating for
the Army, the Army in legislating for its own personnel should be subject
to review.99 This need for judicial review of 'the military becomes clearer
as the personnel seeking protection take on a civilian character. The posi-
tion is crystalized when the rights to be protected are fundamental free-
doms. Army hair standards, derived from Army regulations and directives
promulgated under Congressional statute, affect certain of these freedoms.
Hair style, which necessarily includes hair length, is one of 'the earliest and
most basic forms of communication known. As such, it is a freedom that
must be protected by requiring justification of those regulations which
interfere with it. Also, those regulations are being enforced against Re-
servists, who are civilians for all realistic purposes. The Army apparently
has overlooked the necessity of proving a specific governmental interest in
their hair standards, to justify their interference with the Reservists' free-
dom. "To fail to hold such arbitrary regulations unconstitutional because
of fear of opening the floodgates to litigation ... would be an abdication
of the judiciary's role of final arbiter of the validity of all laws, and pro-
tector of the people... from the governmental exercise of unconstitutional
power."' 00 The intent, however, is not to place the military under judicial
control, but to have 'the judiciary protect those civilians whose freedoms
are under the control of the military. The Reservist is one of those people.
For him 'there is no justification for expediency requiring military discre-
tion rather than judicial review. There is also no need to interfere with
his freedom in the name of military discipline. In fact, there is probably
military value in allowing the Reservist to express himself through his
hair style; he is happier and more cooperative, while the Army still main-
tains other military disciplines.
Perhaps, if the circuit courts of appeals continue to divide on the
constitutionality of hair regulations in schools, the United States Supreme
Court will grant certiorari and determine whether school boards may im-
pose their 'taste or preference as a standard. It might even be decided,
that the freedom to wear one's hair at a desired length is a freedom under
the free speech clause of the first amendment. Regardless, the judiciary
must not abdicate its role where the military is concerned. As stated in
Winters v. United States'0 ' by Mr. Justice Douglas, "[t]here are those who
in tumultuous times turn their faces -the other way saying that it is not
the function of the courts to tell the armed forces how to run a war. Of
99. But see Kester, Soldiers Who Insult The President: An Uneasy Look At Article
88 Of The Uniform Code Of Military Justice, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1697, 1754 (1968).
100. Breen v. KahI, 419 F.2d 1034, 1038 (7th Cir. 1969).
101. 89 S. Ct. 57, 59-60 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1968).
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course that is true. But it is the function of the courts to make sure, in
cases properly coming before them, that the men and women constituting
our armed forces are treated as honored members of society whose rights
do not turn on the charity of a military commander." And in the case of
the Reservist, it is the function of the courts to make sure that a civilian's
rights do not 'turn on the charity of a military commander.
BRUCE V. WEITZEN
THE EFFECT OF THE NEW YORK CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW UPON
THE TREATMENT OF THE MENTALLY INCOMPETENT DEFENDANT
The mental condition of the defendant assumes importance in a crimi-
nal proceeding under two distinct legal concepts. The first involves a deter-
mination of the responsibility of the individual for the alleged criminal
act and thus revolves around his mental condition at the time of its com-
mission. This gives rise to the so-called insanity defense.' The second con-
cept concerns the individual's competency to proceed at trial. In this con-
text, attention is focused upon the mental state of the individual prior to
and during the judicial proceeding.2 The purpose of this comment is to
critically examine the present New York law with respect to this latter con-'
cept. Particular attention will be paid to defects in New York law and the
possible curative effect of the recently enacted Criminal Procedure Law.8
1. There are three principal tests whereby a defendant may be acquitted by reason
of insanity. The most frequently applied is the so called M'Naghten rule. Briefly
stated the defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity if at the time of the act he did
not know the nature or quality of the act, or if he did, he did not know that it was
wrong. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843). The test applied in the District
of Columbia and New Hampshire is the so called Durham rule, under which an
accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental
disease or defect. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862(D.C. Cir. 1954). The third
test is that proposed by the Model Penal Code. Under this test
[a] person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
2. There is a great deal of literature in this area. See T. SzAsz, PsyciiiATRic
JusticE (1965); Bennets, Competency to Stand Trial: A Call for Reform, 59 J. CaIM.
L.C. & P.S. 569 (1968); Eizenstat, Mental Competency to Stand Trial, 4 HARV. Civ.
RIG-Ts-Crv. LiB. L. REv. 379 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Eizenstat]; Hess & Thomas,
Incompetency to Stand Trial: Procedures, Results and Problems, 119 Ass. J. PsYcIAmY
713 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Hess & Thomas]; Silving, The Criminal Law of Mental
Incapacity, 53 J. Ca im. L.C. & P.S. 129 (1969); Slough & Wilson, Mental Capacity to
Stand Trial, 21 U. Prrr. L. REv. 593 (1960); Comment, Incompetency to Stand Trial,
81 HARv. L. REv. 454 (1967).
3. [1970] N.Y. Sass. LAws ch. 996. The Criminal Procedure Law [hereinafter cited as
CPL] is to become effective Sept. 1, 1971. [1970] N.Y. Sass. LAws ch. 996, § 5.
